Purpose -This research aims to identify the factors underlying the corporate governance disclosure policies of the world's largest multinational companies (MNCs) based on the following: (1) national factors related to the MNCs' home countries (2) governance factors related to their governance systems and (3) operational factors arising from the operational characteristics of the MNCs. Methodology -Our sample includes 159 MNCs from 24 countries representing three geographic regions. The corporate governance disclosure policy is examined in terms of level and quality of disclosed information in two different mediums (traditional i.e .paper vs. websites). Results -Multiple linear regressions indicate that national factors, especially cultural ones, are important determinants of MNCs corporate governance disclosure policy in the traditional print mediums. National factors, however, seem to play no part in governance disclosures on the internet but can rather be explained by the international MNCs listing status. Practical implications -This study could guide the harmonization efforts of international standard setters in identifying factors leading to different governance disclosure behaviors and the disclosure medium most influenced by these factors.
Introduction
A small number of large MNCs dominate the global economy. Consequently, the global economy relies upon their stable functioning. When governance mechanisms break down, the impact is felt not only in the home country but around the world (UNCTAD, 2011). A good example of this is the bankruptcies, frauds, social and environmental implications of MNCs businesses and the subprime crisis that was at the origin of the world economic crisis.
The harmful practices of a small number of MNCs called into question the reputation of the majority of them and showed the importance of good corporate governance systems for the stability of economies and wellbeing of society. Good governance practices strengthen the trust between a company and its partners and contributes to creating more value for the company and its shareholders as well as contributing to the economic development of these countries. Governance disclosure represents the most effective tool that regulators can use to encourage companies to comply to best corporate governance practices (Winter Report, 2002) 1 . Furthermore, 2 . Recently, governance disclosure has become an important aspect of corporate transparency, particularly, for those involved in global business and aiming to improve their reputation in international markets (Radebaugh et al. 2006; Markarian et al. 2007 ; Kolk, 2008) .
Previous studies on governance disclosure focused on domestic companies whose disclosure practices are largely influenced by the legal and financial contexts of their home countries (Bushman et al. 2004 ; Vander Bauwhede and Willekens, 2008; Ben Othman and Zeghal, 2008; Khan, 2009) . A few studies have examined whether governance disclosure by multinationals, facing different legal, social and regulatory parameters, could be affected by factors other than those identified for national companies. Furthermore, it should be noted that these studies focused on a single disclosure medium, namely annual reports.
In this study, we try to overcome these limitations by focusing on a sample of MNCs and analyzing two main disclosure mediums namely the annual printed reports (.i.e. annual reports and proxy statements) and websites.
The main objective of our research is to identify the determinants of MNCs governance disclosure policy. Governance disclosure policy will be considered in terms of level and quality of disclosed information via the two types of disclosure mediums chosen. Determinants of governance disclosure policy will be divided into three groups of factors: (1) national factors related to the MNCs' home countries (2) governance factors related to MNCs' governance systems and (3) operational factors arising from the operational characteristics of MNCs. The purpose of our analysis is to determine which factors are likely to best explain MNCs governance disclosure policy in each of the studied mediums. Based on a sample of 159 MNCs from 24 countries, the results of this research show that while national factors remain preeminent determinants of MNCs in annual printed reports, their influence is lessened on the websites where governance disclosure policy is better explained by international MNCs listing status.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the second section presents the theoretical framework of governance disclosure. In the third section, our hypotheses are developed. Section 4 presents the sample and the methodology used to collect data and measure MNCs governance disclosure policy. Results are presented in section 5 and the conclusion is the subject of the last section.
Importance of Governance Disclosure for Companies and other Decision Makers
Recent developments in governance codes and regulations around the world requiring companies to disclose the main aspects of their governance structures and practices, underline the importance of this information to the various company stakeholders, especially following the series of accounting scandals of some companies in recent years (Webb et al. 2008,b) .
Clear and comprehensive information on governance is useful for the investing decisions of both actual and potential investors (Parum, 2005) allowing them to assess the credibility and effectiveness of the governance system of a given society (OECD, 2004 ) which, in turn, allows them to deduce the quality of published accounting figures (Klein, 2002) and make more accurate predictions of future performance (Bhat et al. 2006) .
The multinational status of the company makes this disclosure more useful for investors in view of the multitude of governance standards and principles to which MNCs are subject and the difficulty of assessing these companies' risks and actual and future performances (Luo, 2005 b; Radebaugh et al. 2006 ). Governance disclosure is also important for companies since raising capital at lower cost in international financial markets depends increasingly on efficiency and reliability guarantees that the governance system can provide 3 . This largely explains why companies increasingly provide to their shareholders and other interested parties a description of their situation in terms of governance. However, despite the global consensus on the content of these disclosures 4 , reporting on governance varies widely around the world (Bushman et al. 2004 ; Vander Bauwhede and Willekens, 2008; Ben Othman and Zeghal, 2008).
2.1
Theoretical framework of the determinants of information disclosure on governance According to the agency theory, greater corporate governance disclosure would reduce agency costs resulting either from separating ownership and control or from debt (Vander Bauwhede and Willekens, 2008 ). This incentive is particularly relevant for MNCs because the complexity of their global operation aggravates the informational gap and the difficulties of observing efforts made by managers to optimally use funds of geographically scattered shareholders or creditors (Luo, 2005 b) . From a political perspective, managers can disseminate information about the level of their compliance with good governance principles. They thus avoid the risk of implementing more costly regulations for the company in the governance and governance disclosure fields 5 . The desire to mitigate the adverse effects of political visibility on the international scale is greater for large MNCs that attract more attention from the media, politicians and the general public (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978) . From a signaling perspective, well-governed MNCs would be interested in increasing their governance disclosure level in order to signal their governance quality to investors and have a more advantageous cost of capital. Beyond the desire to reduce agency and political and capital costs, governance disclosure could serve as a tool to legitimize a company's activities. This is especially true for MNCs which need to appear legitimate in terms of the integrity of their governance system and to avoid incurring costs resulting from non-legitimacy, especially after the accounting scandals involving several of these companies (legitimacy theory).
At an international level, accounting models suggest that a number of factors are at play to explain variation of governance disclosure practices. These factors include the political and legal environment (Belkaoui, 1983; La Porta et al. 1998; Jaggi and Low, 2000) , the national culture (Gray, 1988; Zarzeski, 1996) , the economic development level (Belkaoui, 1983; Adhikari and Tondkar, 1992) , and capital market factors such as size and activity level (Adhikari and Tondkar, 1992; Doupnik and Salter, 1995).
Previous Studies on determinants of governance information disclosure
Many studies have been conducted on the determinants of governance disclosure at a national level (Labelle, 2002 Khan, 2009 ). Generally, results of these studies showed that theories discussed above have a strong explanatory power with respect to disclosure behavior for the governance of the studied companies. Within a national framework, variations in governance disclosure levels are explained by factors representing agency costs (corporate size, debt level, ownership structure, etc.), political costs (performance, etc.), cost of capital (inter-listing, intention to raise funds, etc.) or by the characteristics of the corporate governance system (size and independence of the board, etc.). Internationally, these differences are mainly explained by national factors, such as the legal system and the development level of capital markets. However, the usefulness of these theories in explaining governance disclosures of MNCs, remains unexplored. Thus, multinationalisation offers an interesting framework to study the relevance, in the specific context of MNCs, of the factors usually identified in the literature as significant determinants of governance disclosure by national companies.
Factors Affecting the MNCs' Governance Disclosure Policy
We have developed a theoretical model of the determinants of MNCs' governance disclosure policy which involves the following factors: (1) national factors related to the environment of MNCs' home countries (2) governance factors related to the MNCs' governance systems and (3) 
Legal environment
Generally, researchers who have explored the possible relationship between the legal environment and corporate disclosure have highlighted the impact of the following three legal factors: the legal origin, investor protection and law enforcement. In civil law MNCs' governance disclosure Policy countries, accounting practices and standards in corporate law and in the commercial code, are highly codified. In contrast, in common law countries, setting accounting policies by professional organizations results in practices that are more adaptive and innovative in character (Jaggi and Low, 2000) .
Thus, common law creates a governance model oriented towards shareholders, where disclosure is greater to meet their specific needs (Ball et al. 2000) . In addition, a relatively high legal protection level for investors and creditors generally produces a diffuse ownership and a high debt financing level (La Porta et al. 1998 ). These firm characteristics are supposed to trigger agency problems that in turn will generate strong demand for detailed financial disclosure (Jaggi and Low, 2000 
Cultural values
Studying the impact of culture on information disclosure mainly refers to the cultural model of Gray (1988, p.11) suggesting that « The higher a country ranks in terms of uncertainty avoidance and power distance and the lower it ranks in terms of individualism and masculinity then the more likely it is to rank highly in terms of secrecy». A preference for collectivism rather than individualism is likely to be characteristic of this type of closed society since it reflects more concern for the interests of the group most closely involved in the company's management and financing rather than for the interests of external groups such as potential investors or the public in general. A strong hierarchical distance favors the secrecy preserving the inequality and therefore the power of a select few. A preference for secrecy is also a characteristic of a high uncertainty avoidance level resulting from the need to restrict disclosures in order to limit competition uncertainties and ensure safety. Finally, dominance of masculine values (achievement, material success, etc.) favors disclosure to publicize achievements and success. Empirical studies generally confirm these predictions (Salter and Niswander, 1995; Zarzeski, 1996; Hussein, 1996; Williams, 1999; Jaggi and Low, 2000; Hope, 2003 
Economic development level
The more the economic activities and size of a company increase, the more the social function of accounting, as an instrument for measuring and communicating economic data, becomes important (Radebaugh et al. 2006 ). In addition, developed countries have more resources to devote to the accounting standardization and regulation process which will have a direct impact on the requirements and disclosure levels (Adhikari and Tondkar, 1992 
Capital markets development level
The larger the size of capital markets, the larger will be the number of participants in these markets and pressures for disclosure will be more important (Adhikari and Tondkar, 1992) . Moreover, the existence of an active stock market causes increases the information disclosure required for purchasing and selling decisions from shareholders and potential investors (Radebaugh and al. 2006 ). The results of previous research generally confirms these predictions (Bushman et al. 2004 ). We test the impact of the capital markets development on MNCs' disclosure through the following hypothesis:
H4 : MNCs' governance disclosure policy is positively influenced by the capital markets development level in their home countries.
Political system
Political and civil systems can affect the disclosure practices of companies (Belkaoui, 1983) . If political rights and civil liberties in a country are important, the disclosure pressures of stakeholders are intense and companies are encouraged to adopt transparent disclosure policies to meet the public's information needs and maintain their image and external relationships (Williams, 2004) . The following assumption explores the potential impact of the political system on MNCs' governance disclosure policy:
H5 : MNCs' governance disclosure policy is positively influenced by civil and political liberties in their home countries.
Governance factors and MNCs' governance disclosure policy

Board size
Large MNCs will usually have larger boards than domestic companies. Higher board size allows the board to create a pool of resources and experience and can help monitor managers' performance (Luo, 2005 a) . Therefore, we conclude that when the MNCs board is large, control is more efficient, and managers act in the shareholders' interests. The favorable effect of the board size on manager control leads to a positive influence on the MNCs' governance disclosure:
H6 : MNCs' governance disclosure policy is positively influenced by their board size.
Board independence
As the size of the company increases, the need to control agency conflicts increases. The inclusion of independent directors who act as arbitrators in conflicts and ratify decisions concerning serious agency problems will help achieve this control (Luo, 2005 a) .
These arguments suggest that management control and decision-making processes are better in MNCs when the board is composed of a majority of independent directors which would positively influence their governance disclosure.
H7: MNCs' governance disclosure policy is positively influenced by their board independence.
Combining the position of Chairman and CEO
The agency theory considers that combining the position of Chairman and CEO weakens the oversight and governance functions of the board including the firm's information disclosure policy towards outsiders. We test the possible link between the combination of these two functions and governance disclosure of MNCs through the following hypothesis:
H8 : MNCs' governance disclosure policy is negatively influenced by the combination of the positions of Chief Executive
Officer and Chairman of the Board.
Gender diversity of the board
According to the agency theory, diversity of gender in the makeup of the board enables the board to perform its manager's oversight role more effectively (Adams and Pereira, 2009 ). The positive impact of gender diversity on managers' behavior could result, among other things, in a better monitoring of managers' reports (Gul et al. 2011 ) and therefore in better information disclosure (Fernandez-Feijoo et al. 2012 ). We will thus assume that :
H9 : MNCs' governance disclosure policy is positively influenced by the percentage of women within the board.
Board committees
The agency theory predicts that the creation of an audit committee composed of independent members reduces agency costs and improves the information flow between shareholders and managers (Forker, 1992) . Companies with independent audit committees tend to be more active and effective in their governance disclosure (Parsa et al. 2007) . Similarly, companies with a governance committee are more likely to comply with best governance practices and to release information to the public about this. Thus, we expect:
H10 : MNCs' governance disclosure policy is positively influenced by the ratio of independent members within their audit committees.
H11 : MNCs' governance disclosure policy is positively influenced by the existence of a governance committee.
Operational factors and MNCs' governance disclosure policy
MNCs' ownership concentration
According to the agency theory, information disclosure is a particularly important tool that can be used by managers to show that they act in owners' interests. However, in companies where ownership structure is concentrated in the hands of a few strong shareholders with direct access to information, the need for public financial information is less important (La Porta et al.1998 
MNCs' international listing
Foreign exchange trading, particularly in the Englishspeaking financial sector, with its more stringent disclosure requirements, pushes companies to improve their disclosures so as to access these markets (Meek et al. 1995) . Then, in order to achieve the expected benefits of foreign trading, such as obtaining less costly capital, the company will be encouraged to increase its disclosure. In addition, dispersed ownership may increase with access to the many listed foreign exchanges which increases the need for information dissemination. Hrasky and Collett (2005) reveal that international listing of firms favors governance disclosure. Thus, we suggest that:
H13 : MNCs' governance disclosure policy governance is positively influenced by their inter-listing on foreign capital markets.
MNCs' multinationalisation level
The more the company is multinationalised, the greater its influence will be and the more it will attract the attention of regulators, international organizations, international investors and various other groups that are interested in the company's behavior especially with respect to its business management. Thus, it becomes more important for highly multinationalised companies to disclose non-financial information especially regarding its ethics business and governance structures and policies. The disclosure of this information is necessary to promote corporate accountability and complete disclosure of financial information (Luo, 2005 a) . Therefore, we expect that :
H14 : MNCs' governance disclosure policy is positively influenced by their multinationalisation level.
MNCs' size
Previous studies also show a positive association between governance disclosure and company size (Labelle, 2002; Gandia, 2008) . This could reflect the needs of large enterprises to manage their political exposure costs or higher agency costs. Large firms seem to have sufficient resources to provide more relevant disclosure on their governance practices (Vander Bauwhede and Willekens, 2008). Bujaki and Mconomy (2002) suggest that companies that are financed by more borrowing are generally more prodigal in information governance in order to reduce debt agency costs.
MNCs' debt
MNCs' performance
Several studies were able to document a positive impact of companies' performance on their governance disclosure practices (Collett and Hrasky, 2005) . Companies generating significant revenue are indeed best placed to invest in governance practices that could be then disclosed (Labelle, 2002) . Thus, we expect a positive relationship between the size, debt and performance and disclosure policy of MNCs' governance.
Methodology
The sample
To create our sample, we used a list of the 250 largest MNCs in the world as listed in the Global Fortune 500 of 2011. We first removed the MNCs of the financial, banking, insurance and securities sectors due to the specifities of their activities and the particularity of rules used to present their accounts. Then, we removed unlisted MNCs. In addition, we excluded MNCs whose annual reports of 2010 and/or websites were not available or available but in a language other than English or French.
We also excluded MNCs from cross-border mergers between two groups with different nationalities since it would be difficult to test the impact of some national variables on the information disclosure policy on the governance of these MNCs. Finally, we removed MNCs that belong to countries where some national data was lacking. Our final sample is thus composed of 159 listed MNCs spread over 24 countries that represent 3 different regions and operate in 13 different industrial sectors 7 . The sample is summarized in table 1.
Source of data
Information on governance was manually extracted from two kinds of medium: print medium on the one hand and MNCs' websites on the other. In terms of the print medium, our study focuses primarily on the annual reports of 2010 as the main source of information about MNCs. However, in the United States, the study assesses companies' disclosure from a composite base, which incorporates annual reports and proxy statements that represent the main information disclosure medium on governance. Information related to the explanatory variables (operational and governance variables) were manually collected from annual reports and / or proxy statements of MNCs. Cultural dimensions indicators were manually collected from Hofstede 
Measure of the governance disclosure policy
To measure the information disclosure policy on MNCs' governance in each of the analyzed disclosure medium we went through the following steps :
Development of the code frame of the information on governance
Based on a review of the various national and international regulations and recommendations specifying the content of disclosure on governance to be published by companies as well as some research on governance disclosure, particularly in the international context 10 Measurement scale of the information disclosure quality on governance
The second scale consists in assigning a score to each item according to its informative content. Specifically, 0 is given if there is no information; 1 if the information is generally described; 2 if the information is precise (i.e. if it is quantified but not detailed or is detailed but not quantified); 3 if the information is detailed and quantified. This weighted coding procedure that allows for categorizing the information quality on governance in terms of form and detailing level ( literal and general, quantitative or detailed, quantitative and detailed) was inspired by the one used by Wiseman ( 1982) and Cormier et al. (2009) that weights shortlisted informational items from 0 to 3. But unlike these researchers who attribute the maximum score of 3 points to quantitative items, we attribute the mark 3 only to items disclosed in an quantified but also detailed form ( Botosan, 1997 
Content analysis of the disclosure and medium encoding of the disclosed information
Each section of the annual reports, proxy statements and the websites of the selected MNCs has been read carefully and all items on governance, grouped in an analytical framework 11 , were encoded according to the two pre-established coding procedures. It should be noted that all the sampled MNCs' websites were recorded during October 2011 in order to maintain the online coding while ensuring data consistency (Cormier et al. 2009 ). In order to provide greater reliability to the disclosure measurement process, the 11 The measurement grid (checklist) is provided in Appendix 3
Calculation of the MNCs' governance information disclosure indices
At the end of the encoding process, two indices have been calculated for each disclosure medium. Total indexes were created with one measuring the governance disclosure level corresponding to the total of points obtained with 115 points as a maximum index and the other a total index measuring the disclosure quality with 345 points as a maximum index.
LGD
With LGDk (QGDk ): Total index level (quality) of the disclosure of the firm k; N: total number of items expected to be disclosed by a firm k. N is equal to 115. Xik : Score of item i
4.4
Descriptive analysis of the governance disclosure variable Table 3 provides descriptive statistics of the MNCs governance disclosure level (LGD) and quality (QGD) in each studied medium. Compared to the annual print mediums and websites, annual reports present the lowest disclosure levels and qualities on governance with indices below the mean (Panel A  from table 3 ). This is due to a large number of MNCs (almost 40% of the sample), especially American ones (32% of the sample), that do not devote a special section to governance in their annual reports. These MNCs publish this information elsewhere, in particular in proxy statements. When we consider disclosures on governance of American MNCs in both annual reports and proxy statements, level and quality indices of governance disclosures of MNCs have significantly improved. LGD = Governance disclosure level index; QGD = Governance disclosure quality index; N : Number of observations.
According to Panel B of table 3, the average disclosure level for the annual print mediums is established at 58.974 which is slightly above the mean. Half of the sampled MNCs disclose less than 64 items in the annual print mediums (median = 64). 25% of MNCs disclose less than 48 items (quartile 1) and 25% diffuse more than 74 items (quartile 3). The average quality of governance disclosure is 141.534 which remains below the mean. On average, standard deviations of information disclosure on governance compared to the mean are 20.026 and 52.843 items proving the presence of a significant variation of the qualities and levels of governance disclosure between the MNCs of the sample. Results shown in panel C of table 3 show that the information disclosure level on governance via websites of our sampled MNCs is practically at the mean (54.43) while the disclosure quality is set to 130.7 and remains below the mean.
On average, the values of standard deviations of information disclosure compared to the mean indicates that the variation is quite strong for these medium. The comparison of the governance information disclosure policy of MNCs' between the three mediums show a kind of similarity among practices.
Whether we speak about the annual print mediums or the websites of MNCs, disclosure level and quality are close to the mean although they seem slightly higher in the print medium. This result likely shows that MNCs consider their websites as complementary channels to disclose their information on governance. The descriptive analysis per quartile of the variables LGD and QGD reported in table 4 (Panels A and B) confirms the presence of a significant variability in the governance disclosure policy of MNCs', whether in the print mediums or via their websites and justifies our explanatory study about this variability. LGD = Governance disclosure level ; QGD = Governance disclosure quality.
4.5
Measurement and descriptive analysis of the explanatory variables
Measurement of the explanatory variables
Measurements of explanatory and control variables are consistent with national and international empirical research and are summarized in table 5. 
Governance factors
Descriptive analysis of explanatory variables
In of the MNCs are inter-listed on one or more foreign stock markets (INTERLIST). The total assets logarithm that indicates a company's size (SIZE) varied between a minimum of 9.241 and a maximum of 13.529. On average, MNCs in our sample have an ROE of 16.215% (PERF). The minimum level of return on equity is -62% while the maximum is established at 119%. The average debt ratio of the sampled MNCs (DEBT) is 59.21% that indicates that MNCs in our sample are highly leveraged. 
Analytical method
We examine the impact of the selected factors on governance disclosure policy of MNCs through the following multivariate regression model:
LGD k (QGD k )= β 0 + β The index k refers to the company and the index j refers to the country. LGD= Index of the governance disclosure level; QGD = Index of the governance disclosure quality; ORIGIN = 1 if the country has common law legal background and 0 Otherwise; INVEST= protection level score of investors; LAW = average of three variables: regulatory quality, rule of law and corruption control.; INDIV= individualism score of countries; DIS= hierarchical distance score; IA= Uncertainty Avoidance Score; MAS=Masculinity score; ECODEV= Gross national product per person; KMDEV= average of the two variables: average market capitalization of the country adjusted to the GDP over the last four years 2007-2010; 2-Total value of traded shares (in percent of GDP) over the past four years from 2007 to 2010; POLI='Voice and Accountability' Civil liberties score; BSIZE=number of board members ; BINDEP= percentage of the independent directors of the Board ; BDUAL=1 if the positions of Chief Executive Officer and Chairman are combined and 0 otherwise; BDIVER=percentage of women among board members; ACINDEP= percentage of independent directors on the audit committee; GCOM= 1 if there is a governance committee and 0 otherwise; BLOC= percentage of shares held by blockholders with 5% or more of the capital; MULTIN= average of three ratios: foreign sales / total sales -foreign effective / total employment and foreign assets / total assets; INTERLIST =1 if the company is listed on one or more foreign stock markets and 0 otherwise; SIZE=Total assets logarithm; DEBT=total debt/ total assets;PERF= accounting income before interest / equity; εit= residual term.
The correlation matrix between explanatory variables presented in Table 8 shows that more than 0.5 correlations exist among explanatory variables, especially national ones, which leads to a multicollinearity problem. Therefore, we have tested the general multicollinearity level by calculating the VIF (variance inflation factor). We noticed that the VIF of many of our variables exceeds the threshold of 10 which indicates a generalized and widespread multicollinearity in our model (Neter et al. 1989 cited in Williams, 2004) .
In order to solve this problem, we have conducted our multivariate tests through alternately implementing partially correlated variables in four different multivariate models presented in Table 9 . We have tested these models, on the one hand, on level indices LGD and quality indices QGD of information disclosure on governance calculated through the annual print mediums and on the other hand, on those obtained via websites. Since the results obtained for both sets of tests are substantially similar we have decided to only present results related to disclosure level LGD and to report, any differences, if applicable. Table 9 . Explanatory variables distribution in the regression models
Model 1
Governance variables + Operational variables
Model 2
Legal variables + Governance variables except BINDEP and ACINDEP + Operational variables
Model 3
Cultural variables + Governance variables except BINDEP and ACINDEP + Operational variables
Model 4
Economic, financial and political variables 13 + Governance variables except BINDEP, ACINDEP and GCOM + Operational variables 13 Although they are highly correlated, ECODEV and POLI variables were included in the same model (model 4) because the results obtained when separating them in two different models were identical to those obtained when they were included in the same model. Table 10 shows that the four models are significant at p< 0.001 and respectively account for nearly 42%, 50% , 66% and 32% of the dependent variables' variance. The p value of the Breusch-Pagan test presents a statistic of non-significant χ² indicating the absence of the heteroscedasticity problem of residues. The averages of VIF that do not strongly exceed 1, show that there is no multicolinearity problem. We can also notice that implementing cultural dimensions contributes most in improving the explanation of variation occuring in the LGD variable (Model 3: ∆R2 = 0.328***). The results of multivariate tests (Model 2) show that in accordance with our expectations, ORIGIN and LAW variables have a positive and significant impact on the LGD variable. The INVEST variable also has a significant impact on the LGD variable but in the opposite direction (β = -0.289 ***) which probably indicates the need of MNCs from countries with weak investor protection to disclose more information with respect to their governance in order to overcome concerns of international investors concerning weak laws in these countries . It would also enable them to report on the quality of their governance practices (Patel and Dallas, 2002) . As expected, model 3 reveals that LGD increases in the most individualistic cultures INDIV (more competitive and less confidential) and decreases in cultures with high risk aversion IA (where companies fear that disclosing their governance could lead to competitive disadvantages). The coefficient of the cultural variable DIS also appears to be significant but not with the expected sign. This result is, however, consistent with Zarzeski's results (1996) and also with Jaggi and Low (2000), Hope (2003) and Archambault and Archambault (2003) who note that MNCs more dependent on international resources, are likely to deviate from their discretionary original culture and provide better disclosure in order to show the quality of their public operations. The inverse relationship found between the cultural dimension MAS and LGD may be due to the ambiguity of the relationship between this dimension and disclosure advanced by several researchers (Jaggi and Low, 2000 and Archambault and Archambault, 2003) and raised by Gray (1988) himself. Multivariate analysis (Model 4) confirms the positive impact of the variable KMDEV on the LGD of MNCs (β = 0.342 ***) but not the impact of the degree of economic development ECODEV and of the level of civil liberties and freedom of expression, POLI (Model 4).
As expected, the variables BSIZE, BINDEP and BDIVER (models 1, 2, 3 and 4) and MULTIN (model 2, 3, and 4) have a significant and positive impact on the variable LGD.
The lack of consistency in the results of the variables BDUAL and BLOC in addition to the low levels of their significance do not allow for drawing any conclusions about their actual impact. Furthermore, the variables ACINDEP, GCOM and INTERLIST, SIZE, PERF, DEBT appear to be nonsignificant in all models.
Determinants of the governance disclosure policy of MNCs via websites
According to table 11, the adjusted R2 of the four models (15%, 18%, 21% and 25%) are lower than those obtained through the annual print mediums. It also turns out that implementing national factors does not significantly increase the explanatory power of the models. Only the implementation of economic, financial and political variables (particularly the KMDEV variable) allows us to significantly enhance R2 (Model 4: Δ R2 = 0.075 ***). Results of the regression (model 2, 3 and 4) show that the legal variables (ORIGIN, INVEST and LAW), the variables ECODEV and POLI, in addition to two of the four cultural dimensions, INDIV and DIS, are not relevant to an explanation of the disclosure policy of MNCs' governance. Furthermore, the results highlight a significant relationship (at 10% and 5 %) but in the direction opposite to the one predicted between the cultural values of uncertainty avoidance IA and masculinity MAS and LGD. This can possibly be explained by the multinational nature of our companies that may drive them to depart from the usual secretive direction of their countries of origin in order to compete in international capital markets. In this context, Zarzeski (1996, p.20) mentions that : « When a firm does business in a global market, it is operating in a different 'culture' and therefore may need to have different practices. High levels of financial disclosures may be necessary for international survival because disclosure of quality operations should result in lower resource costs. When enterprises from more secretive countries perceive economic gain from increasing their financial disclosures, cultural borrowing may occur. The culture being borrowed will be a 'global market culture' rather than a specific country culture». The variable KMDEV (model 4) also appears to exert an impact opposite to the one predicted on the LGD of MNCs. This reveals that MNCs that cannot meet their financing needs on their smaller and less liquid domestic capital markets would find it preferable to invest more in their governance disclosure policy, notably through their websites, to reassure foreign investors about the reliability of their governance structures. The results of the regression (models 1, 2 and 3) confirm the negative impact of the BDUAL variable and the positive impact of gender diversity (BDIVER) and international trading (INTERLIST) on the governance disclosure level of MNCs. Governance variables BSIZE, BINDEP, ACINDEP and GCOM and operational variables MULTIN, BLOC are not significant. 
Analysis of Results and Conclusions
The main purpose of this study is to identify the determinants of the information disclosure policy with respect to MNCs' governance. Governance disclosure policy was approached in terms of the volume and the quality of disclosed information via two types of disclosure medium (traditional print mediums and websites). The determinants of the disclosure policy on governance were grouped into three groups of factors: (1) national factors related to the environment of the countries of origin of MNCs, (2) governance factors related to MNCs' governance systems and (3) operational factors arising from the operational characteristics of MNCs. The descriptive analysis revealed that the level and quality of the disclosure on governance differ significantly between MNCs, particularly in the annual print mediums. The results of the multivariate tests show that MNCs from the most individualistic societies and societies with the lowest uncertainty avoidance level disclose more and better information on their governance. The same tendency was observed in MNCs from countries that are characterized by their common law legal origin, by a respect for proper law enforcement and by having more extensively developed capital markets. Beyond the national factors, size, independence, gender diversity in the board of directors and the degree of multinationalisation of MNCs appear to have a significant positive impact on their disclosure policy on governance. Unlike their disclosure through the print mediums, the governance disclosure policy of MNCs via their websites does not seem to reflect the impact of national factors. Moreover, we have observed that MNCs from societies characterized by high risk aversion and a low masculinity level tend to deviate from the secretive direction of their countries to provide better disclosure on governance through their websites. The same trend was revealed in MNCs belonging to countries with small and less developed stock markets. This result can be explained by the largely voluntary nature of the disclosure on governance through websites that generally follow more strategic reasons, such as the need to raise funds on the international markets at low cost. The significant and positive impact that we have found from the foreign inter-listing of MNCs on their governance disclosure policy via websites strongly confirms these suggestions.
The results of this research suggest that even among the MNCs, the diversity of cultural, legal and financial contexts will continue to cause differences in international disclosure practices on governance through the annual print mediums and therefore constitute an obstacle to the harmonization efforts of these disclosures. Instead, it seems that the perception of managers of MNCs that the internet is an effective mechanism for information dissemination to a wider global audience which encourages them to adopt good information disclosure policy on governance via this medium in order to meet the needs of international stakeholders rather than national ones or even present the information differently without reference to the legal, cultural, economic and financial impacts of their countries. Therefore, greater harmonization of the information disclosure policy on governance could possibly be made via the internet rather than annual reports or other print mediums.
Our study contributes through its originality in searching for the determinants of information disclosure on governance at the international level by studying the relevance of theoretical frameworks usually asked to explain the disclosure on corporate governance in general rather than in the specific context of MNCs. Adopting a comparative approach (between two mediums that differ in terms of format, frequency, type and extended audience), showed that the determinants of the disclosure policy on governance differ from one medium to another. This allows for extending previous international studies that are focused on a single medium of disclosure, namely annual reports. From our perspective, the use of a disclosure index on governance that is manually self-construct from the considered disclosure mediums allows us to supplement international studies that almost exclusively use disclosure indexes on governance developed by rating agencies (Bushman et al., 2004; . Vander Bauwhede and Willekens, 2008). Finally, this research only studies the determinants of governance disclosure of MNCs'. Future research could examine financial consequences of information disclosure on MNCs' governance. (ICGN, 1999 (ICGN, -2005 .
